Algorithmic Game Theory
Computing equilibria and learning strategies in multi-agent strategic settings.
Many real-world systems involve strategic interactions — defenders and attackers, planners and responders. We develop scalable methods for computing and learning equilibria in these settings.
Key directions:
- End-to-end gradient descent for Stackelberg games
- Deep fictitious play for continuous action spaces
- Security games and green security patrol scheduling
- Learning adversary models from data
Selected publications:
(Wang et al., 2022; Niu et al., 2025; Kamra et al., 2019; Cooney et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020)
References
2025
- Finding a Multiple Follower Stackelberg Equilibrium: A Fully First-Order Method2025In submission
2022
- Coordinating Followers to Reach Better Equilibria: End-to-End Gradient Descent for Stackelberg GamesIn AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2022
2020
- Scalable Game-Focused Learning of Adversary Models: Data-to-Decisions in Network Security GamesIn International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), 2020
2019
- DeepFP for Finding Approximate Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Action SpacesIn Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec), 2019
- Learning to Signal in the Goldilocks Zone: Improving Adversary Compliance in Security GamesIn European Conference on Machine Learning and Principles and Practice of Knowledge Discovery in Databases (ECML-PKDD), 2019